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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify the variables affecting the decision to make 
contributions to personal pension plans and the amount of such contributions. For this 
purpose, we specify and estimate a Tobit model for a sample based on the 1995 Personal 
Income Taxpayers Panel prepared by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Finance) formed by 3,041 taxpayers, of whom 358 made contributions to 
pension plans. Our results suggest that individuals decide to invest in pension plans on 
complex grounds combining the wish to benefit from tax savings and to ensure they will 
receive supplementary income upon retirement. 
Key words: Pension plans, retirement purposes, tax planning. 
J.E.L. classification: H31. 
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1. Introduction 
The tax treatment of pension plans is currently a matter of some debate in Spain. 
The government’s position is that the favourable tax treatment accorded to such 
instruments provides an incentive for the better off to invest, while the lower and middle 
income groups hardly make any use of them. Thus, investment in pension plans is more a 
matter of tax planning than financial prudence in anticipation of retirement. This paper 
seeks to make a contribution to this debate, and to this end we shall use information 
provided in 1995 personal income tax returns to investigate the reasons underlying the two 
decisions made by the holders of pension plans, first to set up a plan and then to make 
contributions for a given amount. 
The Spanish Pension Plans and Funds Regulation Act, 1987 (Law 8/June 8, 1987) 
regulated pension plans, defined as voluntary prudential institutions providing benefits 
supplementing those of the public social security system. The Act refers to three types of 
pension plan depending on the person who offers them. These are “occupational schemes” 
in which the sponsor of the pension plan is an organisation, corporation, company or firm 
(that is, an employer) and the members are employees; “associated schemes” sponsored by 
associations or trade unions for their members or affiliates; and “personal schemes” 
sponsored by one or more financial entities and having private individuals as their 
members. In this paper, we shall focus on personal pension plans. 
Pension plans may also be classified on the basis of the obligations provided for in 
the contract. Thus, “defined benefits plans” fix the amount of the final pension the 
beneficiaries will receive; “defined contributions plans” establish the amount of the 
contributions the sponsors and, where applicable, participants must make; and “mixed 
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plans” simultaneously stipulate eventual benefits and the amount of contributions. While 
occupational and associated pension plans may fall into any of these three categories, 
personal pension plans will always be defined contributions schemes. 
Pension plans have received a highly favourable tax treatment since they were first 
regulated in 1987, and as a result they now represent a growing part of the financial assets 
held by individuals. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the tax 
regime applicable to pension plans in Spain since 1987. The data presented are expressed in 
terms of the internal rate of return of pension plans in the three periods 1987-1991, 1992-
1998 and from 1999 onwards. 
The applied model is set out and discussed in Section 3. In order to discover the 
factors explaining the decisions associated with investment in personal pension plans, we 
specify and estimate a Tobit model for a sample drawn from the 1995 Personal Income 
Taxpayers Panel prepared by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Spanish Ministry of Economy 
and Finance). Our conclusion from this exercise is that the holders of personal pension 
plans are motivated both by reasons of financial prudence and tax savings. 
Section 4 ends the paper with some final considerations. 
 
2. The tax treatment of pension plans  
In this section, we shall describe the tax treatment of pension plans and quantify 
their internal rate of return (IRR) since 1987. This analysis distinguishes between the three 
moments at which the tax treatment affects investment in pension plans, namely when 
contributions are made, during the accumulation of returns, and when the benefit 
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contracted is received.1 Table 1 shows the expressions for the IRR of the pension plans in 
the three periods considered. The tax treatment of the plans is summarised in Table 2. 
[TABLES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE] 
2.1. Contributions  
The contributions made to pension plans are tax allowable within certain limits. 
Initially, in the period 1987-1991, the contribution could be deducted from taxable income 
provided the amount of the deduction was less than 15 percent of the sum of net earnings 
from work and business activities (earned income) or 500,000 pesetas. The remaining 
contributions were eligible for a 15 percent tax credit up to a limit of 750,000 pesetas. In 
the early years, these limits were applied to each tax return, but this changed in 1989, when 
married people were allowed to  file separate returns, and tax credits and allowances 
became applicable to each taxpayer included in the return.  
There were two key changes to the tax treatment of contributions to pension plans 
in the ensuing years. Firstly, the 15 percent tax credit was removed (1992) and, secondly, 
the absolute and relative limits on the deduction from taxable income were raised.  
Since 2003 the absolute deduction for people aged under 53 years has been € 8,000, 
with an additional € 1,250 for each additional year over the age of 52 to a maximum of € 
24,250 for pension plan contributors aged over 65. Meanwhile, the relative limit on 
deductions was removed in 2002, and the maximum allowable contribution has since been 
100 percent of taxable income excluding capital gains. 
Based on this regulatory framework, let us initially assume an initial capital IC 
available for investment in a pension plan. The contribution made produces tax savings. 
 
1 See Scholes et al.(2002). 
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Given that the unit deduction will differ depending on whether it is applied to taxable 
income or tax liability, which shall denote each alternative by dq, where q takes the value 1 
or 2, respectively, for deductions from taxable income or tax liability. If the contribution is 
deductible from taxable income, d1 = tpx, where tpx is the marginal rate subject to the age x
at which the taxpayer made the contribution. If it is deductible from tax liability, then d2 =
0,15.
Hence, the net initial capital, NIC, will be equal to:  
)1( qdICNIC = [1] 
 
2.2. Accumulation 
The returns generated by pension plans are not taxable during the accumulation 
period. In the first place, the pension plan holder does not pay any income tax on the 
returns generated, which are not imputed to him. Meanwhile, the pension fund itself, 
though subject to Corporate Income Tax, benefits from a zero tax rate. Thus, the fund is 
required to file a corporate income tax return, but only to recover amounts withheld at 
source. Finally, Net Wealth Tax is not levied on the investment, because the vested rights 
in the plan were not initially subject to the tax, and they are currently exempt. 
Hence, the net rate of interest on the pension plan investment is: 
itii sN == )1( [2] 
where i is the nominal gross rate, and ts the corporate tax rate. 
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If x is the age of the individual making contributions to the pension plan, and j is 
her age upon retirement, the final capital accumulated will thus be: 
xjxj
N iICiICFC
 +=+= )1()1( [3] 
 
2.3. Benefits 
When benefits are paid, the total amount is included in taxable income by way of 
earnings from labour. The way in which the tax base is established and the applicable tax 
rate calculated has changed over time. 
As shown in Table 2, the benefits received from the plan are eligible for an 
allowance. This was initially 2 percent of the returns obtained and is currently 40 percent. 
Between 1991 and 1998, the annualised returns (i.e. the quotient of taxable returns 
and the number of years in which they we e generated) were taxed at the marginal tax rate. 
The remainder returns were taxed at the average rate, because it would not be equitable to 
apply a progressive tax schedule to returns generated over a number of years. Since 1999, 
the taxable part of pension plan benefits have been taxed at the relevant marginal tax rate. 
Let us call the equivalent tax rate applicable to benefits te, and the taxable part of 
the final capital obtained g. The tax liability will now be: 
FCgtT eP = [4] 
And the net final capital will be: 
 )1()1()1( gtiICgtFCTFCNFC e
xj
eP +===
 [5] 
The formula for IRR is: 
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 The IRR of pension plans has grown continuously since 1987 thanks to the tax 
regime, which is more favourable than for any other savings instrument. As shown in 
Figure 1, these assets have gradually increased their share of the portfolios held by 
individuals to somewhat more than 6 percent at present.2
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
2.4. Income, age and pension plan investment  
Let us now focus on the variables influencing the decision to invest in a personal 
pension plan. Based on the expression of IRR, we can predict the relationship between 
pension plan investment and the investor’s income. Since the year considered in the 
present empirical study is 1995, we shall work with the IRR expression for the period 1992-
1998, which is: 
1
1
.1)1(
1











+=
xj
px
e
t
tgiIRR  [6’] 
In order to obtain the relationship between IRR and income levels, we first need to 
establish the relationship between the marginal tax rate at the time the contribution is 
made, tpx, and the equivalent tax rate levied on the benefits, te. As explained above, the latter 
is the weighted average of the average and marginal tax rates at the time the benefit is paid. 
 
2 Figure 1 was constructed on the basis of the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy, prepared by the Bank of 
Spain. Exhaustive information concerning pension plans in Spain is available in Dirección General de Seguros y 
Fondos de Pensiones (2004) and at the website of INVERCO, Asociación de Instituciones de Inversión Colectiva y Fondos 
de Pensiones: www.inverco.es.  
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We may therefore make the general assumption that it will be related to the initial marginal 
tax rate in the following manner: 
pxe tkt = , 10 << k [7] 
Thus, the pension plan participant’s income at the time the benefit is received, and 
hence the applicable tax rate, will be a given proportion of the income she received and the 
applicable tax rate applied while she was active. We may now calculate how IRR will vary 
when tpx changes: 
 ( ) ( ) 01
1
1
1
)(
1
2
11
>





	









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


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px
e
px t
kg
t
tg
xj
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t
IRR  [8]  
Accordingly, the IRR of pension plans rises in line with contributors’ incomes and 
the applicable tax rates. We may therefore expect to find a positive relationship between 
income and pension plan contributions. 
Let us look now at the incentive to invest in pension plans and age. The IRR of 
pension savings is of no use to us here, because investments of differing duration cannot 
be compared on this basis. Consequently, we shall calculate the net present value of the 
investment in the plan, assuming that the alternative investment is tax exempt. 
Based on the net initial and final capital respectively given in [1] and [5], the net 
present value of a  one euro investment in a pension plan would be: 
)1()1()1(
)1(
)1(
kgttgttgt
i
NFCtNPV
pxepxepx
xjpx
==+=
=
+
+=  [9] 
 Hence, anybody investing in a personal pension plan obtains a subsidy per unit 
invested, which is the same at any age. This subsidy represents compensation for the 
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absence  of liquidity inherent in pension plans. However, if we take into account that the 
loss of liquidity diminish as people grow older and the recovery of the investment draws 
nearer, we may conclude that the incentive to invest in pension plans is greater for older 
people.  
 
3. Empirical evidence for personal pension plan investment decisions 
 In this section, we seek to answer the two questions forming the objective of this 
paper. What variables influence the decision to invest in a personal pension plan? And, 
what variables affect the amount individuals decide to contribute to their pension plans? 
To answer these questions, we shall specify and estimate a Tobit model for a 1995 sample 
(the latest available) from the Institute of Fiscal Studies Personal Income Taxpayers Panel. 
The sample is formed by 3,041 tax returns, of which 358 include contributions to personal 
pension plans.  
 Following Cabrer, Sancho, and Serrano (2001), the specification of the model is as 
follow3. The regressand Yi can take a value of zero or the value of the variable 
*
iY , known 
as the latent variable: 
( )
( )



+=>
=
iiiii
iii
uXYXY
YXY
0,/
00,/
*
*
[10] 
In the first stage a Probit model is used to determine the probability that the 
variable *iY will take a value of zero rather than a positive value. In the second stage, a real 
and positive value is assigned to the variable Yi after a positive value has been 
 
3 See also, Wooldridge (2003). 
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probabilistically given to *iY , and the following model is specified with the subset of 
observations having a regressand other than zero: 
 iii uXY += 
* [11] 
where  are the coefficients, Xi the regressors, and ui is the error term, which is a random 
variable distributed based on normal N(0,2). 
In our model, the dependent variable is the amount of contributions made to 
pension plans. The explanatory variables are those usually considered in the literature4, to 
which have added some others that are specific to the reality of Spain. The variables used 
and the expected sign for each are shown in Table 3. Table 4, meanwhile, reflects the 
percentage of personal pension plan contributors for each variable, as well as the average 
contributions made. As the first row of this table shows, 11.77 percent of 1995 tax returns 
declare contributions to personal pension plans, the average amount of which was 150,564 
pesetas.5
The regressors considered were as follows: 
 Age. Based on the argument derived from expression [9], we may expect to find a 
positive relationship between age and the contributions made to pension plans. This 
variable has been included quadratically as well. 
 
4 See, for example, Guariglia and Markose (2000), Joulfaian and Richardson (2001), and Engelhardt and 
Madrian (2004) We have not been able to use the number of children, because this variable was not reliable  
in the sample. 
5 According to data from the Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones, 1,423,542 people contributed to 
personal pension plans in 1995, investing an average of 132,823 pesetas. In 2004, 7,224,792 people made 
contributions, investing an average of € 746,87 (124,000 pesetas). 
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Marital status. We have used a dummy variable with a value of zero for unmarried 
and one for married taxpayers. We opted to assign a positive sign to this variable, because 
we believe that prudential behaviour is more likely in the case of married people. 
Income level. Based on expression [8], we may expect a positive relationship 
between individuals’ income levels (i.e. taxable income prior to  tax allowance for 
contributions) and the amount of the contributions made to pension plans. For the same 
reason, we may assign a positive value to the variable marginal tax rate. In addition, 
higher earners will also have greater capacity for savings. The income variable has also been 
included quadratically. 
Occupation. We have used dummy variables for the categories entrepreneurs, 
professionals and salaried employees. We consider that the first two categories are likely to 
make higher contributions than employees because their mandatory social security 
contributions are smaller. Also, we would expect professionals to make higher 
contributions because they are, in general, better educated and are likely to be more aware 
of  the advantages of this saving instrument . 
Year-end tax bill. The aim of this variable is to verify the hypothesis that people 
invests in pension plans with a view to reducing their year-end tax bill (i.e. the part of 
income tax not paid through withholdings at source), which is due upon the presentation 
of the income tax return. Thus, the higher the  tax bill, the higher will be the pension plan 
contributions made. 
Membership of occupational pension plans. Our hypothesis is that membership 
of occupational pension schemes will encourage the  participation on personal plans. We 
have employed a dummy variable with a value of one for taxpayers who are members of 
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occupational schemes and zero for those who are not. In the case of the former, however, 
we expect the contributions made to fall as the employer’s contribution rises. This 
variable has been assigned a negative sign. 
Prior year’s contribution. We believe that the behaviour of people contributing to 
pension plans may be to some extent routine, with the result that they will continue to 
contribute a roughly similar amount each year after setting up the plan. Consequently, we 
have assigned a positive sign to this variable. 
Mortgage repayments. A person who is still repaying the mortgage on his home 
will have less spare cash to contribute to his pension plan. The higher these mortgage 
repayments are, the less the person will contribute to the plan. 
Life insurance contributions. Like pension plans, life insurance policies are 
prudential savings instruments, although they do not have the same characteristics. While 
pension plans receive a more favourable tax treatment, life insurance are more liquid. If 
pension plans and life insurance are substitute assets, we may expect that higher life 
insurance contributions will be associated with smaller contributions to pension plans. On 
the other hand, if they act as complementary assets (as table 4 would seem to indicate), this 
relationship will be the reverse. In short, we are unable to assign a positive or negative sign 
to this variable. 
[TABLES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The relationship between investment in the home, pension plans and life insurance 
is clearly apparent in figures 2 and 3, which are constructed on the basis of the sample of 
tax returns used for the applied study of 1995. It may be observed in figure 2, that buying a 
house is the most important investment made by people in their lifetimes. However, 
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mortgage repayments begin to fall after the age of 50. Contributions to pension plans and 
life insurance are considerably smaller, but increase as individuals age. Average pension 
plan contributions rise fastest among people aged over 60, while life insurance 
contributions fall after the age of 65. 
Figure 3, which takes income levels into account, reflects sustained growth in 
average mortgage repayments along the income scale. This effect is particularly pronounced 
in the two upper deciles. There is also a slight rise in investment in pension plans and life 
insurance until the last two deciles, where average contributions increase sharply, especially 
in the case of pension plans. 
[FIGURES 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Based on the above variables, we have specified three models which provide 
alternative explanations for the decision to invest in a personal pension plan. The first of 
these, which we shall call the “prudential model”, is based on the hypothesis that 
individuals invest in pension plans basically to save against their retirement, perhaps as a 
supplement to other retirement funds obtained from sources such as the social security or 
life insurance. The explanatory variables in this model are age, marital status, occupation, 
membership of an occupational pension plan, employer’s contributions, prior 
contributions, mortgage repayments and contributions to life insurance. The specification 
of the model is as follows: 
),,,
,,,,,,,(1
INSURANCEMORTGAGEPRIORCEMPLOYERC
ALPOCCUPATIONSALARIEDALPROFESSIONURENTREPRENESTATUSAGECfPLAN =
[12] 
 The second “tax planning model” refers to the hypothesis that the individual’s main 
motivation is to obtain the tax benefits available to investors in pension plans. The 
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exogenous variables included in the model are income level, marginal tax rate, year-end tax 
bill, mortgage repayments and life insurance contributions. The specification is: 
),,,,,(2 INSURANCEMORTGAGETAXBILLMARGINALTINCOMECfPLAN = [13] 
 Finally, the “general model” includes all of the exogenous variables and is based on 
the hypothesis that investment in pension plans can be explained both by prudential and 
tax planning concerns. The specification of the model is as follows: 
),
,,,,,
,,,,,,,(3
INSURANCEIMORTGAGE
PRIORCEMPLOYERCALPOCCUPATIONTAXBILLMARGINALT
SALARIEDALPROFESSIONURENTREPRENEINCOMESTATUSAGECfPLAN =
[14] 
 The heteroskedastically robust estimation of the models was performed using the 
Econometric Views (Eviews) application, version 3.1. Using the logarithm of the verisimilitude 
function and the Aikake, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria as the selection criteria, we 
chose the general model as the most adequate. The results of the estimation are shown in 
Table 5. 
The variables found to be significant took the expected signs. In the first place, 
the amount of contributions rises with age, although at a decreasing rate (AGE) until the 
age of 45, whereafter contributions begin to decline as individuals grow older. As shown in 
Table 4, the percentage of older people still making contributions falls sharply, although 
the average amount set aside rises. Secondly, salaried employees make smaller contributions 
than people in other occupations (SALARIED). Meanwhile, we have been able to confirm 
that membership of an occupational pension plan stimulates investment in personal plans 
(OCCUPATIONALP), and that people benefiting from higher sponsor’s contributions to 
such plans invest less in their personal plans than they would were the sponsor’s 
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contribution smaller (EMPLOYERC). Furthermore, savings in a given year are positively 
affected by the prior year’s contributions (PRIORC).  
While the above variables refer to prudential reasons for setting up a personal 
pension plan, there is another significant variable which is related with tax planning. In fact, 
contributions grow with income, although once again at a decreasing rate (INCOME) up to 
a threshold of 10.6 million pesetas (approximately € 64,000) covering the earnings of 99 
percent of income taxpayers. Thereafter, the amount of contributions begins to decrease as 
income rises.  
The last variable found to be significant in the estimation of the model expressed 
in [14] is the amount of mortgage repayments (MORTGAGE). This variable also took the 
expected sign and fits both with prudential and tax planning arguments for pension plan 
investment. Based on Table 5, we may affirm that taxpayers set aside less by way of private 
pension plan contributions as the amount of mortgage repayments made during the year 
rises. 
In light of these results, we may conclude that individuals decide to invest in 
personal pension plans on complex grounds combining the wish to benefit from tax 
savings and to ensure they will receive supplementary income upon retirement. These 
results are in line with those obtained by literature in other countries. 
[]TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Tables A1 and A2 given in the Appendix respectively reflect the estimation of the 
prudential and tax planning models. In the former, age and the three variables related with 
investment in pension plans (membership of occupational pension plans, employer’s 
contributions and prior contributions) are significant and take the expected signs.  In the 
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tax planning model, meanwhile, the significant variables are income, tax bill and mortgage 
repayments, which once again take the expected signs. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 In this paper, we have examined the variables affecting the decisions to invest in a 
personal pension plan and the amount of contributions. We have found a combination of 
prudential and tax planning reasons for these decisions. Age and occupation affect 
individuals, as do membership of occupational pension plans, and previous contributions 
to their own personal plans, as well as the cost of mortgage repayments and income levels. 
 Our empirical study uses 1995 data, seven years after the first regulation of pension 
plans. In that year, these instruments had come to represent 4.4 percent of assets held by 
private individuals. Eight years on, this share has risen to 6.2 percent, confirming the 
consolidation of these prudential savings vehicles. Consequently, it will be necessary to 
repeat the estimations carried out in order to confirm whether, as we believe, the variables 
that explain investment in pension plans in 1995 remain significant in the present.*
* A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the XII Public Economy Conference held in Palma de Mallorca (Spain) 
on February 3 and 4, 2005. The authors would like to thank José María Labeaga and Llorenç Pou for their helpful 
comments and suggestions, and the Institute for Fiscal Studies and Ministry of Science and Technology (project 
SEC2003-05784/ECO) for the funding received. 
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TABLE 1. Pension plan IRR, 1987-2004 
Period IRR g
1987-1991 IRRP.87 = 11
).1(
)·1(
1










+
xj
q
e
d
tgi 0.98 
1992-1998 IRRP.92 = 11
).1(
)·1(
1










+
xj
px
e
t
tgi 0.95 or 1 
1999 and thereafter IRRP.99 = 11
).1(
)·1(
1










+
xj
px
pj
t
tg
i
0.6 
(if j-x>2) 
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TABLE 2. Tax treatment of pension plans
1987 – 1991 1992 - 1998 1999 - 2004
CONTRIBUTIONS
Tax saving tpx or 15% tpx tpx
Up to 52 years > 52 years
-- Absolute Ptas. 500,000 – 750,000 Ptas. 750,000 -1,100,000
In 1999: Ptas. 1,100,000
In 2000-01: Ptas. 1,200,000
In 2002: Ptas. 1,200,000
Since 2003: € 8,000
----
2000-01:+ Ptas. 100,000 (age–52)
In 2002:+ Ptas. 200,000 (age–52)
Since 2003: + €1,250 (age-52)
Limits on
allowances and
tax credits
-- Relative 15% earned income 15%-20% earned income 100% general taxable income
(In 1999-01: 20%, 25%)
100% general taxable income
(In 1999-01: 20%, 25%, 40%)
ACCUMULATION
Corporate income tax Zero rate
Net Wealth Tax Not subject Exempt Exempt
BENEFITS
Tax base Final capital Final capital Final capital
Taxable returns 98% 95% – 100% 60%
Applicable tax rate te te tpj
Source: Own work.
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TABLE 3. Variables and expected sign 
Variable Symbol Expected sign 
Contributions to pension plans 
Age 
Marital status 
Income level 
Business activity 
Professional activity  
Salaried employment  
Marginal tax rate 
Year-end tax bill 
Membership of occupational scheme 
Employer´s contribution  
Prior year’s contribution 
Mortgage repayments 
Life insurance contributions 
PLAN 
AGE 
STATUS 
INCOME 
ENTREPRENEUR 
PROFESSIONAL 
SALARIED 
MARGINALT 
TAXBILL 
OCCUPATIONALP 
EMPLOYERC 
PRIORC 
MORTGAGE 
LINSURANCE 
 
+
+
+
¿? 
+
-
+
+
+
-
+
-
¿? 
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TABLE 4. Personal pension plan membership and average contributions 
 
VARIABLE PERCENTAGE 
CONTRIBUTORS
AVERAGE 
CONTRIBUTION 
(pesetas) 
TOTAL 11.77  150,564 
AGE 
 
20-25 
25-30 
30-35 
35-40 
40-45 
45-50 
50-55 
55-60 
60-65 
 
3.33  
 4.03  
 9.52  
 11.82  
 15.99  
 20.23  
 16.03  
 9.05  
 6.60 
 
76,100  
 71,294  
 107,387  
 143,148  
 157,821  
 168,435  
 162,782  
 182,430  
 213,851 
MARITAL STATUS 
 
Unmarried 
Married 
 
10.30  
 13.12 
 
123,855  
 169,825 
INCOME LEVEL 
 
Decile     1 
Decile     2 
Decile     3 
Decile     4 
Decile     5 
Decile     6 
Decile     7 
Decile     8 
Decile     9 
Decil    10 
 
2.63  
 3.95  
 5.59  
 6.25  
 7.57  
 10.53  
 11.18  
 15.13  
 21.38  
 33.55 
 
50,323  
 82,919  
 81,680  
 88,752  
 94,569  
 116,845  
 92,666  
 106,532  
 152,520  
 250,495 
OCCUPATION 
 
Entrepreneur 
 Professional  
 Salaried employee  
 
11.52  
 21.30  
 11.74  
 
156,509  
 212,584  
 147,810  
MARGINAL TAX RATE 
 
0.0% 
 20.0% 
 22.0% 
 24.5% 
 27.0% 
 30.0% 
 32.0% 
 34.0% 
 36.0% 
 38.0% 
 40.0% 
 42.5% 
 45.0% 
 47.0% 
 49.0% 
 51.0% 
 53.5% 
 
3.65  
 4.51  
 6.24  
 8.73  
 12.23  
 17.54  
 19.77  
 23.30  
 30.00  
 22.22  
 35.48  
 46.15  
 27.78  
 41.67  
 37.50  
 9.09  
 52.38 
 
72,952  
 101,716  
 86,341  
 98,111  
 103,398  
 134,515  
 147,252  
 165,826  
 118,837  
 286,168  
 184,481  
 195,188  
 167,069  
 395,785  
 515,049  
 151,029  
 390,886 
TAX BILL 
 
Negative 
Positive 
 
18.04  
 11.05 
 
252,739  
 131,215 
PARTICIPATION IN 
OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION PLAN 
 
Yes 
No 
 
54.64 
 10.36 
 
101,415 
 159,105 
MORTGAGE 
REPAYMENTS 
 
Yes 
No 
 
15.12 
 10.50 
 
122,641 
 165,916 
LIFE INSURANCE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Yes 
No 
 
23.52 
 9.04 
 
190,944 
 126,118  
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TABLE 5. Results of the Tobit estimation for the general model 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -772944.2 -64292.13 108576.3 -7.118904 0.0000
AGE 22964.83 1910.17 4915.381 4.672035 0.0000
AGE*AGE  -259.8054 -21.68 54.84662 -4.736945 0.0000
INCOME 0.042513 0.003514 0.005972 7.118444 0.0000
INCOME*INCOME -1.98E-09 -1,64693E-10 4.19E-10 -4.732125 0.0000
SALARIED -38574.77 -43470.35 16299.70 -2.366595 0.0180
OCCUPATIONALP 172098.7 43790.72 29915.47 5.752832 0.0000
EMPLOYERC -0.483151 -0.040188 0.067742 -7.132190 0.0000
PRIORC 1.290833 0.107369 0.050385 25.61938 0.0000
MORTGAGE -0.025753 -0.002142 0.011719 -2.197532 0.0280
Error  Distribution
SCALE:C(11) 159924.4 4444.289 35.98424 0.0000
R-squared 0.534140 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.532602 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 50112.37 Akaike info criterion 3.479154
Sum squared resid 7.61E+12 Schwarz criterion 3.500930
Log likelihood -5279.054 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.486981
Avg. log likelihood -1.735960
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1. Results of the Tobit estimation for the prudential model 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -918664.1 108308.6 -8.481915 0.0000
AGE 31463.59 4931.230 6.380475 0.0000
AGE*AGE  -350.2904 54.97829 -6.371431 0.0000
OCCUPATIONALP 190266.5 32070.75 5.932709 0.0000
EMPLOYERC -0.475665 0.070643 -6.733330 0.0000
PRIORC 1.466353 0.044976 32.60324 0.0000
Error Distribution 
SCALE:C(7) 168214.5 3625.361 46.39937 0.0000
R-squared 0.502038 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.501053 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 51776.03 Akaike info criterion 3.499670
Sum squared resid 8.13E+12 Schwarz criterion 3.513527
Log likelihood -5314.248 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.504651
Avg. log likelihood -1.747533
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
TABLE A2. Results of the Tobit estimation for the tax planning model 
 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -574386.7 27999.27 -20.51434 0.0000
INCOME 0.111300 0.008877 12.53834 0.0000
INCOME*INCOME -4.10E-09 6.32E-10 -6.490179 0.0000
TAXBILL 0.045730 0.019646 2.327738 0.0199
MORTGAGE -0.071568 0.023655 -3.025521 0.0025
Error Distribution 
SCALE:C(6) 266798.1 11630.07 22.94038 0.0000
R-squared 0.208576 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.207272 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 65262.49 Akaike info criterion 3.674403
Sum squared resid 1.29E+13 Schwarz criterion 3.686280
Log likelihood -5580.930 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.678672
Avg. log likelihood -1.835228
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
Figure2. Ageand average investmentin assets.
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Figure 1. Distribution of family assets.1984-2003
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Figure 2. Age and average investment in different assets.
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Figure 3. Income levels and average investment in assets.
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Why do people invest in personal pension plans? 
Félix Domínguez-Barrero (fdomin@unizar.es)* 
Julio López-Laborda (julio.lopez@unizar.es) 
Department of Public Economics, University of Zaragoza, Gran Vía, 2, 50.005-Zaragoza, Spain 
Telephone: 34 976 76 18 05/08. Fax: 34  976 76 18 40 
(November 2005) 
 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify the variables affecting the decision to make 
contributions to personal pension plans and the amount of such contributions. For this 
purpose, we specify and estimate a Tobit model for a sample based on the 1995 Personal 
Income Taxpayers Panel prepared by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Finance) formed by 3,041 taxpayers, of whom 358 made contributions to 
pension plans. Our results suggest that individuals decide to invest in pension plans on 
complex grounds combining the wish to benefit from tax savings and to ensure they will 
receive supplementary income upon retirement. 
Key words: Pension plans, retirement purposes, tax planning. 
J.E.L. classification: H31. 
 
*correspondant author. 
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1. Introduction 
The tax treatment of pension plans is currently a matter of some debate in Spain. 
The government’s position is that the favourable tax treatment accorded to such 
instruments provides an incentive for the better off to invest, while the lower and middle 
income groups hardly make any use of them. Thus, investment in pension plans is more a 
matter of tax planning than financial prudence in anticipation of retirement. This paper 
seeks to make a contribution to this debate, and to this end we shall use information 
provided in 1995 personal income tax returns to investigate the reasons underlying the two 
decisions made by the holders of pension plans, first to set up a plan and then to make 
contributions for a given amount. 
The Spanish Pension Plans and Funds Regulation Act, 1987 (Law 8/June 8, 1987) 
regulated pension plans, defined as voluntary prudential institutions providing benefits 
supplementing those of the public social security system. The Act refers to three types of 
pension plan depending on the person who offers them. These are “occupational schemes” 
in which the sponsor of the pension plan is an organisation, corporation, company or firm 
(that is, an employer) and the members are employees; “associated schemes” sponsored by 
associations or trade unions for their members or affiliates; and “personal schemes” 
sponsored by one or more financial entities and having private individuals as their 
members. In this paper, we shall focus on personal pension plans. 
Pension plans may also be classified on the basis of the obligations provided for in 
the contract. Thus, “defined benefits plans” fix the amount of the final pension the 
beneficiaries will receive; “defined contributions plans” establish the amount of the 
contributions the sponsors and, where applicable, participants must make; and “mixed 
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plans” simultaneously stipulate eventual benefits and the amount of contributions. While 
occupational and associated pension plans may fall into any of these three categories, 
personal pension plans will always be defined contributions schemes. 
Pension plans have received a highly favourable tax treatment since they were first 
regulated in 1987, and as a result they now represent a growing part of the financial assets 
held by individuals. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the tax 
regime applicable to pension plans in Spain since 1987. The data presented are expressed in 
terms of the internal rate of return of pension plans in the three following periods: from 
1987 to 1991, with the initial regulation for pension plans; from 1992 to 1998, after the 
1991 Spanish Personal Income Tax reform; and from 1999 onwards, following the 1998 
reform. 
The applied model is set out and discussed in Section 3. In order to discover the 
factors explaining the decisions associated with investment in personal pension plans, we 
specify and estimate a Tobit model for a sample drawn from the 1995 Personal Income 
Taxpayers Panel prepared by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Spanish Ministry of Economy 
and Finance). Our conclusion from this exercise is that the holders of personal pension 
plans are motivated both by reasons of financial prudence and tax savings. 
Section 4 ends the paper with some final considerations. 
 
2. The tax treatment of pension plans  
In this section, we shall describe the tax treatment of pension plans and quantify 
their internal rate of return (IRR) since 1987. This analysis distinguishes between the three 
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4
moments at which the tax treatment affects investment in pension plans, namely when 
contributions are made, during the accumulation of returns, and when the benefit 
contracted is received.1 Table 1 shows the expressions for the IRR of the pension plans in 
the three periods considered. The tax treatment of the plans is summarised in Table 2. 
[TABLES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE] 
2.1. Contributions  
The contributions made to pension plans are tax allowable in the contributor’s 
Personal Income Tax within certain limits. Initially, in the period 1987-1991, the 
contribution could be deducted from taxable income provided the amount of the 
deduction was less than 15 percent of the sum of net earnings from work and business 
activities (earned income) or 500,000 pesetas. The remaining contributions were eligible for a 
15 percent tax credit up to a limit of 750,000 pesetas. In the early years, these limits were 
applied to each tax return, but this changed in 1989, when married people were allowed to 
file separate returns, and tax credits and allowances became applicable to each taxpayer 
included in the return.  
There were two key changes to the tax treatment of contributions to pension plans 
in the ensuing years. Firstly, the 15 percent tax credit was removed (1992) and, secondly, 
the absolute and relative limits on the deduction from taxable income were raised.  
Since 2003 the absolute deduction for people aged under 53 years has been € 8,000, 
with an additional € 1,250 for each additional year over the age of 52 to a maximum of € 
24,250 for pension plan contributors aged over 65. Meanwhile, the relative limit on 
 
1 See Scholes et al.(2002). Antolín, de Serrres, and de la Maisonneuve (2004) and Yoo and de Serres (2004) 
examine the tax treatment of private pensions in the OECD countries. 
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deductions was removed in 2002, and the maximum allowable contribution has since been 
100 percent of taxable income excluding capital gains. 
Based on this regulatory framework, let us initially assume an initial capital IC 
available for investment in a pension plan. The contribution made produces tax savings. 
Given that the unit deduction will differ depending on whether it is applied to taxable 
income or tax liability, which shall denote each alternative by dq, where q takes the value 1 
or 2, respectively, for deductions from taxable income or tax liability. If the contribution is 
deductible from taxable income, d1 = tpx, where tpx is the marginal rate subject to the age x
at which the taxpayer made the contribution. If it is deductible from tax liability, then d2 =
0,15.
Hence, the net initial capital, NIC, will be equal to:  
)1( qdICNIC = [1] 
 
2.2. Accumulation 
The returns generated by pension plans are not taxable during the accumulation 
period. In the first place, the pension plan holder does not pay any Income Tax on the 
returns generated, which are not imputed to him. Meanwhile, the pension fund itself, 
though subject to Corporate Income Tax, benefits from a zero tax rate. Thus, the fund is 
required to file a corporate income tax return, but only to recover amounts withheld at 
source. Finally, Net Wealth Tax is not levied on the investment, because the vested rights 
in the plan were not initially subject to the tax, and they are currently exempt. 
Hence, the net rate of interest on the pension plan investment is: 
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itii sN == )1( [2] 
where i is the nominal gross rate, and ts the corporate tax rate. 
If x is the age of the individual making contributions to the pension plan, and j is 
her age upon retirement, the final capital accumulated will thus be: 
xjxj
N iICiICFC
 +=+= )1()1( [3] 
 
2.3. Benefits 
Pension benefits could be withdrawn in the form of lump-sums or in the form of 
annuities. We will refer here only to the first case. When benefits are paid, the total amount 
is included in taxable income by way of earnings from labour. The way in which the tax 
base is established and the applicable tax rate calculated has changed over time.  
As shown in Table 2, the benefits received from the plan are eligible for an 
allowance. This was initially 2 percent of the returns obtained and is currently 40 percent. 
Between 1987 and 1998, the annualised returns (i.e. the quotient of taxable returns 
and the number of years in which they were generated) were taxed at the marginal tax rate. 
The remainder returns were taxed at the average rate, because it would not be equitable to 
apply a progressive tax schedule to returns generated over a number of years. So, the tax 
rate applicable to benefits is the weighted average of the average and marginal tax rates at 
the time the funds are withdrawn. Since 1999, the taxable part of pension plan benefits 
have been taxed at the relevant marginal tax rate. 
Let us call the tax rate applicable to benefits te, and the taxable part of the final 
capital obtained g. The tax liability will now be: 
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FCgtT eP = [4] 
And the net final capital will be: 
 )1()1()1( gtiICgtFCTFCNFC e
xj
eP +===
 [5] 
The formula for IRR is: 
 1
1
1
)1(1
11






	




+=



	

=
 xj
q
exj
d
tgi
NIC
NFCIRR  [6] 
 The IRR of pension plans has grown continuously since 1987 thanks to the tax 
regime, which is more favourable than for any other savings instrument. As shown in 
Figure 1, these assets have gradually increased their share of the portfolios held by 
individuals to somewhat more than 6 percent at present.2
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.4. Income, age and pension plan investment  
Let us now focus on the variables influencing the decision to invest in a personal 
pension plan. Based on the expression of IRR, we can predict the relationship between 
pension plan investment and the investor’s income. Since the year considered in the 
present empirical study is 1995, we shall work with the IRR expression for the period 1992-
1998, which is: 
 
2 Figure 1 was constructed on the basis of the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy, prepared by the Bank of 
Spain. Exhaustive information concerning pension plans in Spain is available in Dirección General de Seguros y 
Fondos de Pensiones (2004) and at the website of INVERCO, Asociación de Instituciones de Inversión Colectiva y Fondos 
de Pensiones: www.inverco.es.  
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1
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px
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tgiIRR  [6’] 
In order to obtain the relationship between IRR and income levels, we first need to 
establish the relationship between the marginal tax rate at the time the contribution is 
made, tpx, and the tax rate levied on the benefits, te. As explained above, the latter is the 
weighted average of the average and marginal tax rates at the time the benefit is paid. We 
may therefore make the general assumption that it will be related to the initial marginal tax 
rate in the following manner: 
pxe tkt = , 10 << k [7] 
Thus, the pension plan participant’s income at the time the benefit is received, and 
hence the applicable tax rate, will be a given proportion of the income she received and the 
applicable tax rate applied while she was active. We may now calculate how IRR will vary 
when tpx changes: 
 ( ) ( ) 01
1
1
1
)(
1
2
11
>





	










	






+
=




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xj
px
e
px t
kg
t
tg
xj
i
t
IRR  [8]  
Accordingly, the IRR of pension plans rises in line with contributors’ incomes and 
the applicable tax rates. We may therefore expect to find a positive relationship between 
income and pension plan contributions. 
Let us look now at the incentive to invest in pension plans and age. The IRR of 
pension savings is of no use to us here, because investments of differing duration cannot 
be compared on this basis. Consequently, we shall calculate the net present value of the 
investment in the plan, assuming that the alternative investment is tax exempt. 
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Based on the net initial and final capital respectively given in [1] and [5], the net 
present value of a one euro investment in a pension plan would be: 
)1()1()1(
)1(
)1(
kgttgttgt
i
NFCtNPV
pxepxepx
xjpx
==+=
=
+
+=  [9] 
 Hence, anybody investing in a personal pension plan obtains a subsidy per unit 
invested, which is the same at any age. This subsidy represents compensation for the 
absence of liquidity inherent in pension plans. However, if we take into account that the 
loss of liquidity diminish as people grow older and the recovery of the investment draws 
nearer, we may conclude that the incentive to invest in pension plans is greater for older 
people.  
 
3. Empirical evidence for personal pension plan investment decisions 
 In this section, we seek to answer the two questions forming the objective of this 
paper. What variables influence the decision to invest in a personal pension plan? And, 
what variables affect the amount individuals decide to contribute to their pension plans? 
To answer these questions, we shall specify and estimate a Tobit model for a 1995 sample 
(the latest available) from the Institute of Fiscal Studies Personal Income Taxpayers Panel. 
The sample is formed by 3,041 tax returns, of which 358 include contributions to personal 
pension plans.  
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Following Cabrer, Sancho, and Serrano (2001), the specification of the model is as 
follow3. The regressand Yi can take a value of zero or the value of the variable 
*
iY , known 
as the latent variable: 
( )
( )



+=>
=
iiiii
iii
uXYXY
YXY
0,/
00,/
*
*
[10] 
In the first stage a Probit model is used to determine the probability that the 
variable *iY will take a value of zero rather than a positive value. In the second stage, a real 
and positive value is assigned to the variable Yi after a positive value has been 
probabilistically given to *iY , and the following model is specified with the subset of 
observations having a regressand other than zero: 
 iii uXY += 
* [11] 
where  are the coefficients, Xi the regressors, and ui is the error term, which is a random 
variable distributed based on normal N(0,2). 
In our model, the dependent variable is the amount of contributions made to 
pension plans. The explanatory variables are those usually considered in the literature4, to 
which have added some others that are specific to the reality of Spain. The variables used 
and the expected sign for each are shown in Table 3. Table 4, meanwhile, reflects the 
percentage of personal pension plan contributors for each variable, as well as the average 
contributions made. As the first row of this table shows, 11.77 percent of 1995 tax returns 
 
3 See also, Wooldridge (2003). 
4 See, for example, Guariglia and Markose (2000), Joulfaian and Richardson (2001), and Engelhardt and 
Madrian (2004) We have not been able to use the number of children, because this variable was not reliable  
in the sample. 
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declare contributions to personal pension plans, the average amount of which was 150,564 
pesetas.5
The regressors considered were as follows: 
 Age. Based on the argument derived from expression [9], we may expect to find a 
positive relationship between age and the contributions made to pension plans. This 
variable has been included quadratically as well. 
 Marital status. We have used a dummy variable with a value of zero for unmarried 
and one for married taxpayers. We opted to assign a positive sign to this variable, because 
we believe that prudential behaviour is more likely in the case of married people. 
Income level. Based on expression [8], we may expect a positive relationship 
between individuals’ income levels (i.e. taxable income prior to tax allowance for 
contributions) and the amount of the contributions made to pension plans. For the same 
reason, we may assign a positive value to the variable marginal tax rate. In addition, 
higher earners will also have greater capacity for savings. The income variable has also been 
included quadratically. 
Occupation. We have used dummy variables for the categories entrepreneurs, 
professionals and salaried employees. We consider that the first two categories are likely to 
make higher contributions than employees because their mandatory social security 
contributions are smaller. Also, we would expect professionals to make higher 
contributions because they are, in general, better educated and are likely to be more aware 
of  the advantages of this saving instrument . 
 
5 Following the Spanish Tax Agency -Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria- 9 percent of 1995 tax returns 
declared contributions to some kind of pension plan, the average amount of which was 184,150 pesetas. 
According to data from the Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones, 1,423,542 people contributed to 
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Year-end tax bill. The aim of this variable is to verify the hypothesis that people 
invests in pension plans with a view to reducing their year-end tax bill (i.e. the part of 
income tax not paid through withholdings at source), which is due upon the presentation 
of the income tax return. Thus, the higher the  tax bill, the higher will be the pension plan 
contributions made. 
Membership of occupational pension plans. Our hypothesis is that membership 
of occupational pension schemes will encourage the participation on personal plans. We 
have employed a dummy variable with a value of one for taxpayers who are members of 
occupational schemes and zero for those who are not. In the case of the former, however, 
we expect the contributions made to fall as the employer’s contribution rises. This 
variable has been assigned a negative sign. 
Prior year’s contribution. We believe that the behaviour of people contributing to 
pension plans may be to some extent routine, with the result that they will continue to 
contribute a roughly similar amount each year after setting up the plan. Consequently, we 
have assigned a positive sign to this variable. 
Mortgage repayments. A person who is still repaying the mortgage on his home 
will have less spare cash to contribute to his pension plan. The higher these mortgage 
repayments are, the less the person will contribute to the plan. 
Life insurance contributions. Like pension plans, life insurance policies are 
prudential savings instruments, although they do not have the same characteristics. While 
pension plans receive a more favourable tax treatment, life insurance are more liquid. If 
pension plans and life insurance are substitute assets, we may expect that higher life 
 
personal pension plans in 1995, investing an average of 132,823 pesetas. In 2004, 7,224,792 people made 
contributions, investing an average of € 746,87 (124,000 pesetas).  
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insurance contributions will be associated with smaller contributions to pension plans. On 
the other hand, if they act as complementary assets (as table 4 would seem to indicate), this 
relationship will be the reverse. In short, we are unable to assign a positive or negative sign 
to this variable. 
[TABLES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The relationship between investment in the home, pension plans and life insurance 
is clearly apparent in figures 2 and 3, which are constructed on the basis of the sample of 
tax returns used for the applied study of 1995. It may be observed in figure 2, that buying a 
house is the most important investment made by people in their lifetimes. However, 
mortgage repayments begin to fall after the age of 50. Contributions to pension plans and 
life insurance are considerably smaller, but increase as individuals age. Average pension 
plan contributions rise fastest among people aged over 60, while life insurance 
contributions fall after the age of 65. 
Figure 3, which takes income levels into account, reflects sustained growth in 
average mortgage repayments along the income scale. This effect is particularly pronounced 
in the two upper deciles. There is also a slight rise in investment in pension plans and life 
insurance until the last two deciles, where average contributions increase sharply, especially 
in the case of pension plans. 
[FIGURES 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Based on the above variables, we have specified three models which provide 
alternative explanations for the decision to invest in a personal pension plan. The first of 
these, which we shall call the “prudential model”, is based on the hypothesis that 
individuals invest in pension plans basically to save against their retirement, perhaps as a 
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supplement to other retirement funds obtained from sources such as the social security or 
life insurance. The explanatory variables in this model are age, marital status, occupation, 
membership of an occupational pension plan, employer’s contributions, prior 
contributions, mortgage repayments and contributions to life insurance. The specification 
of the model is as follows: 
),,,
,,,,,,,(1
INSURANCEMORTGAGEPRIORCEMPLOYERC
ALPOCCUPATIONSALARIEDALPROFESSIONURENTREPRENESTATUSAGECfPLAN =
[12] 
 The second “tax planning model” refers to the hypothesis that the individual’s main 
motivation is to obtain the tax benefits available to investors in pension plans. The 
exogenous variables included in the model are income level, marginal tax rate, year-end tax 
bill, mortgage repayments and life insurance contributions. The specification is: 
),,,,,(2 INSURANCEMORTGAGETAXBILLMARGINALTINCOMECfPLAN = [13] 
 Finally, the “general model” includes all of the exogenous variables and is based on 
the hypothesis that investment in pension plans can be explained both by prudential and 
tax planning concerns. The specification of the model is as follows: 
),
,,,,,
,,,,,,,(3
INSURANCEIMORTGAGE
PRIORCEMPLOYERCALPOCCUPATIONTAXBILLMARGINALT
SALARIEDALPROFESSIONURENTREPRENEINCOMESTATUSAGECfPLAN =
[14] 
 The heteroskedastically robust estimation of the models was performed using the 
Econometric Views (Eviews) application, version 3.1. Using the logarithm of the 
verisimilitude function and the Aikake, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria as the 
selection criteria, we chose the general model as the most adequate. The results of the 
estimation are shown in Table 5. 
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The variables found to be significant took the expected signs. In the first place, 
the amount of contributions rises with age, although at a decreasing rate (AGE) until the 
age of 45, whereafter contributions begin to decline as individuals grow older. As shown in 
Table 4, the percentage of older people still making contributions falls sharply, although 
the average amount set aside rises. Secondly, salaried employees make smaller contributions 
than people in other occupations (SALARIED). Meanwhile, we have been able to confirm 
that membership of an occupational pension plan stimulates investment in personal plans 
(OCCUPATIONALP), and that people benefiting from higher sponsor’s contributions to 
such plans invest less in their personal plans than they would were the sponsor’s 
contribution smaller (EMPLOYERC). Furthermore, savings in a given year are positively 
affected by the prior year’s contributions (PRIORC).  
While the above variables refer to prudential reasons for setting up a personal 
pension plan, there is another significant variable which is related with tax planning. In fact, 
contributions grow with income, although once again at a decreasing rate (INCOME) up to 
a threshold of 10.6 million pesetas (approximately € 64,000) covering the earnings of 99 
percent of income taxpayers. Thereafter, the amount of contributions begins to decrease as 
income rises.  
The last variable found to be significant in the estimation of the model expressed 
in [14] is the amount of mortgage repayments (MORTGAGE). This variable also took the 
expected sign and fits both with prudential and tax planning arguments for pension plan 
investment. Based on Table 5, we may affirm that taxpayers set aside less by way of private 
pension plan contributions as the amount of mortgage repayments made during the year 
rises. 
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In light of these results, we may conclude that individuals decide to invest in 
personal pension plans on complex grounds combining the wish to benefit from tax 
savings and to ensure they will receive supplementary income upon retirement. These 
results are in line with those obtained by literature in other countries. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Tables A1 and A2 given in the Appendix respectively reflect the estimation of the 
prudential and tax planning models. In the former, age and the three variables related with 
investment in pension plans (membership of occupational pension plans, employer’s 
contributions and prior contributions) are significant and take the expected signs.  In the 
tax planning model, meanwhile, the significant variables are income, tax bill and mortgage 
repayments, which once again take the expected signs. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 In this paper, we have examined the variables affecting the decisions to invest in a 
personal pension plan and the amount of contributions. We have found a combination of 
prudential and tax planning reasons for these decisions. Age and occupation affect 
individuals, as do membership of occupational pension plans, and previous contributions 
to their own personal plans, as well as the cost of mortgage repayments and income levels. 
 Our empirical study uses 1995 data, seven years after the first regulation of pension 
plans. In that year, these instruments had come to represent 4.4 percent of assets held by 
private individuals. Eight years on, this share has risen to 6.2 percent, confirming the 
consolidation of these prudential savings vehicles. Consequently, it will be necessary to 
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repeat the estimations carried out in order to confirm whether, as we believe, the variables 
that explain investment in pension plans in 1995 remain significant in the present.*
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TABLE 1. Pension plan IRR, 1987-2004 
Period IRR g
1987-1991 IRRP.87 = 11
)1()·1(
1





+
xj
q
e
d
tgi 0.98 
1992-1998 IRRP.92 = 11
)1()·1(
1





+
xj
px
e
t
tgi 0.95 or 1 
1999 and thereafter IRRP.99 = 11
)1()·1(
1





+
xj
px
pj
t
tgi
0.6 
(if j-x>2) 
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TABLE 2. Tax treatment of pension plans
1987 – 1991 1992 - 1998 1999 - 2004
CONTRIBUTIONS
Personal Income Tax saving tpx or 15% tpx tpx
Up to 52 years > 52 years
-- Absolute Ptas. 500,000 – 750,000 Ptas. 750,000 -1,100,000
In 1999: Ptas. 1,100,000
In 2000-01: Ptas. 1,200,000
In 2002: Ptas. 1,200,000
Since 2003: € 8,000
----
2000-01:+ Ptas. 100,000 (age–52)
In 2002:+ Ptas. 200,000 (age–52)
Since 2003: + €1,250 (age-52)
Limits on
allowances and
tax credits
-- Relative 15% earned income 15%-20% earned income 100% general taxable income
(In 1999-01: 20%, 25%)
100% general taxable income
(In 1999-01: 20%, 25%, 40%)
ACCUMULATION
Corporate Income Tax Zero rate
Net Wealth Tax Not subject Exempt Exempt
BENEFITS
Personal Income Tax base Final capital Final capital Final capital
Taxable returns 98% 95% – 100% 60%
Applicable tax rate te te tpj
Source: Own work.
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TABLE 3. Variables and expected sign 
Variable Symbol Expected sign 
Contributions to pension plans 
Age 
Marital status 
Income level 
Business activity 
Professional activity  
Salaried employment  
Marginal tax rate 
Year-end tax bill 
Membership of occupational scheme 
Employer´s contribution  
Prior year’s contribution 
Mortgage repayments 
Life insurance contributions 
PLAN 
AGE 
STATUS 
INCOME 
ENTREPRENEUR 
PROFESSIONAL 
SALARIED 
MARGINALT 
TAXBILL 
OCCUPATIONALP 
EMPLOYERC 
PRIORC 
MORTGAGE 
LINSURANCE 
 
+
+
+
¿? 
+
-
+
+
+
-
+
-
¿? 
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TABLE 4. Personal pension plan membership and average contributions 
 
VARIABLE PERCENTAGE 
CONTRIBUTORS
AVERAGE 
CONTRIBUTION 
(pesetas) 
TOTAL 11.77  150,564 
AGE 
 
20-25 
25-30 
30-35 
35-40 
40-45 
45-50 
50-55 
55-60 
60-65 
 
3.33  
 4.03  
 9.52  
 11.82  
 15.99  
 20.23  
 16.03  
 9.05  
 6.60 
 
76,100  
 71,294  
 107,387  
 143,148  
 157,821  
 168,435  
 162,782  
 182,430  
 213,851 
MARITAL STATUS 
 
Unmarried 
Married 
 
10.30  
 13.12 
 
123,855  
 169,825 
INCOME LEVEL 
 
Decile     1 
Decile     2 
Decile     3 
Decile     4 
Decile     5 
Decile     6 
Decile     7 
Decile     8 
Decile     9 
Decil    10 
 
2.63  
 3.95  
 5.59  
 6.25  
 7.57  
 10.53  
 11.18  
 15.13  
 21.38  
 33.55 
 
50,323  
 82,919  
 81,680  
 88,752  
 94,569  
 116,845  
 92,666  
 106,532  
 152,520  
 250,495 
OCCUPATION 
 
Entrepreneur 
 Professional  
 Salaried employee  
 
11.52  
 21.30  
 11.74  
 
156,509  
 212,584  
 147,810  
MARGINAL TAX RATE 
 
0.0% 
 20.0% 
 22.0% 
 24.5% 
 27.0% 
 30.0% 
 32.0% 
 34.0% 
 36.0% 
 38.0% 
 40.0% 
 42.5% 
 45.0% 
 47.0% 
 49.0% 
 51.0% 
 53.5% 
 
3.65  
 4.51  
 6.24  
 8.73  
 12.23  
 17.54  
 19.77  
 23.30  
 30.00  
 22.22  
 35.48  
 46.15  
 27.78  
 41.67  
 37.50  
 9.09  
 52.38 
 
72,952  
 101,716  
 86,341  
 98,111  
 103,398  
 134,515  
 147,252  
 165,826  
 118,837  
 286,168  
 184,481  
 195,188  
 167,069  
 395,785  
 515,049  
 151,029  
 390,886 
TAX BILL 
 
Negative 
Positive 
 
18.04  
 11.05 
 
252,739  
 131,215 
PARTICIPATION IN 
OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION PLAN 
 
Yes 
No 
 
54.64 
 10.36 
 
101,415 
 159,105 
MORTGAGE 
REPAYMENTS 
 
Yes 
No 
 
15.12 
 10.50 
 
122,641 
 165,916 
LIFE INSURANCE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Yes 
No 
 
23.52 
 9.04 
 
190,944 
 126,118  
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TABLE 5. Results of the Tobit estimation for the general model 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -772944.2 -64292.13 108576.3 -7.118904 0.0000
AGE 22964.83 1910.17 4915.381 4.672035 0.0000
AGE*AGE  -259.8054 -21.68 54.84662 -4.736945 0.0000
INCOME 0.042513 0.003514 0.005972 7.118444 0.0000
INCOME*INCOME -1.98E-09 -1,64693E-10 4.19E-10 -4.732125 0.0000
SALARIED -38574.77 -43470.35 16299.70 -2.366595 0.0180
OCCUPATIONALP 172098.7 43790.72 29915.47 5.752832 0.0000
EMPLOYERC -0.483151 -0.040188 0.067742 -7.132190 0.0000
PRIORC 1.290833 0.107369 0.050385 25.61938 0.0000
MORTGAGE -0.025753 -0.002142 0.011719 -2.197532 0.0280
Error  Distribution
SCALE:C(11) 159924.4 4444.289 35.98424 0.0000
R-squared 0.534140 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.532602 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 50112.37 Akaike info criterion 3.479154
Sum squared resid 7.61E+12 Schwarz criterion 3.500930
Log likelihood -5279.054 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.486981
Avg. log likelihood -1.735960
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1. Results of the Tobit estimation for the prudential model 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -918664.1 108308.6 -8.481915 0.0000
AGE 31463.59 4931.230 6.380475 0.0000
AGE*AGE  -350.2904 54.97829 -6.371431 0.0000
OCCUPATIONALP 190266.5 32070.75 5.932709 0.0000
EMPLOYERC -0.475665 0.070643 -6.733330 0.0000
PRIORC 1.466353 0.044976 32.60324 0.0000
Error Distribution 
SCALE:C(7) 168214.5 3625.361 46.39937 0.0000
R-squared 0.502038 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.501053 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 51776.03 Akaike info criterion 3.499670
Sum squared resid 8.13E+12 Schwarz criterion 3.513527
Log likelihood -5314.248 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.504651
Avg. log likelihood -1.747533
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
TABLE A2. Results of the Tobit estimation for the tax planning model 
 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -574386.7 27999.27 -20.51434 0.0000
INCOME 0.111300 0.008877 12.53834 0.0000
INCOME*INCOME -4.10E-09 6.32E-10 -6.490179 0.0000
TAXBILL 0.045730 0.019646 2.327738 0.0199
MORTGAGE -0.071568 0.023655 -3.025521 0.0025
Error Distribution 
SCALE:C(6) 266798.1 11630.07 22.94038 0.0000
R-squared 0.208576 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.207272 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 65262.49 Akaike info criterion 3.674403
Sum squared resid 1.29E+13 Schwarz criterion 3.686280
Log likelihood -5580.930 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.678672
Avg. log likelihood -1.835228
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
Figure2. Ageand average investmentin assets.
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Figure 1. Distribution of family assets.1984-2003
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Figure 2. Age and average investment in different assets.
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Figure 3. Income levels and average investment in assets.
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Why do people invest in personal pension plans? 
Félix Domínguez-Barrero (fdomin@unizar.es)* 
Julio López-Laborda (julio.lopez@unizar.es) 
Department of Public Economics, University of Zaragoza, Gran Vía, 2, 50.005-Zaragoza, Spain 
Telephone: 34 976 76 18 05/08. Fax: 34  976 76 18 40 
(November 2005) 
 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify the variables affecting the decision to make 
contributions to personal pension plans and the amount of such contributions. For this 
purpose, we specify and estimate a Tobit model for a sample based on the 1995 Personal 
Income Taxpayers Panel prepared by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Finance) formed by 3,041 taxpayers, of whom 358 made contributions to 
pension plans. Our results suggest that individuals decide to invest in pension plans on 
complex grounds combining the wish to benefit from tax savings and to ensure they will 
receive supplementary income upon retirement. 
Key words: Pension plans, retirement purposes, tax planning. 
J.E.L. classification: H31. 
 
*correspondant author. 
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1. Introduction 
The tax treatment of pension plans is currently a matter of some debate in Spain. 
The government’s position is that the favourable tax treatment accorded to such 
instruments provides an incentive for the better off to invest, while the lower and middle 
income groups hardly make any use of them. Thus, investment in pension plans is more a 
matter of tax planning than financial prudence in anticipation of retirement. This paper 
seeks to make a contribution to this debate, and to this end we shall use information 
provided in 1995 personal income tax returns to investigate the reasons underlying the two 
decisions made by the holders of pension plans, first to set up a plan and then to make 
contributions for a given amount. 
The Spanish Pension Plans and Funds Regulation Act, 1987 (Law 8/June 8, 1987) 
regulated pension plans, defined as voluntary prudential institutions providing benefits 
supplementing those of the public social security system. The Act refers to three types of 
pension plan depending on the person who offers them. These are “occupational schemes” 
in which the sponsor of the pension plan is an organisation, corporation, company or firm 
(that is, an employer) and the members are employees; “associated schemes” sponsored by 
associations or trade unions for their members or affiliates; and “personal schemes” 
sponsored by one or more financial entities and having private individuals as their 
members. In this paper, we shall focus on personal pension plans. 
Pension plans may also be classified on the basis of the obligations provided for in 
the contract. Thus, “defined benefits plans” fix the amount of the final pension the 
beneficiaries will receive; “defined contributions plans” establish the amount of the 
contributions the sponsors and, where applicable, participants must make; and “mixed 
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plans” simultaneously stipulate eventual benefits and the amount of contributions. While 
occupational and associated pension plans may fall into any of these three categories, 
personal pension plans will always be defined contributions schemes. 
Pension plans have received a highly favourable tax treatment since they were first 
regulated in 1987, and as a result they now represent a growing part of the financial assets 
held by individuals. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the tax 
regime applicable to pension plans in Spain since 1987. The data presented are expressed in 
terms of the internal rate of return of pension plans in the three following periods: from 
1987 to 1991, with the initial regulation for pension plans; from 1992 to 1998, after the 
1991 Spanish Personal Income Tax reform; and from 1999 onwards, following the 1998 
reform. 
The applied model is set out and discussed in Section 3. In order to discover the 
factors explaining the decisions associated with investment in personal pension plans, we 
specify and estimate a Tobit model for a sample drawn from the 1995 Personal Income 
Taxpayers Panel prepared by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Spanish Ministry of Economy 
and Finance). Our conclusion from this exercise is that the holders of personal pension 
plans are motivated both by reasons of financial prudence and tax savings. 
Section 4 ends the paper with some final considerations. 
 
2. The tax treatment of pension plans  
In this section, we shall describe the tax treatment of pension plans and quantify 
their internal rate of return (IRR) since 1987. This analysis distinguishes between the three 
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moments at which the tax treatment affects investment in pension plans, namely when 
contributions are made, during the accumulation of returns, and when the benefit 
contracted is received.1 Table 1 shows the expressions for the IRR of the pension plans in 
the three periods considered. The tax treatment of the plans is summarised in Table 2. 
[TABLES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE] 
2.1. Contributions  
The contributions made to pension plans are tax allowable in the contributor’s 
Personal Income Tax within certain limits. Initially, in the period 1987-1991, the 
contribution could be deducted from taxable income provided the amount of the 
deduction was less than 15 percent of the sum of net earnings from work and business 
activities (earned income) or 500,000 pesetas. The remaining contributions were eligible for a 
15 percent tax credit up to a limit of 750,000 pesetas. In the early years, these limits were 
applied to each tax return, but this changed in 1989, when married people were allowed to 
file separate returns, and tax credits and allowances became applicable to each taxpayer 
included in the return.  
There were two key changes to the tax treatment of contributions to pension plans 
in the ensuing years. Firstly, the 15 percent tax credit was removed (1992) and, secondly, 
the absolute and relative limits on the deduction from taxable income were raised.  
Since 2003 the absolute deduction for people aged under 53 years has been € 8,000, 
with an additional € 1,250 for each additional year over the age of 52 to a maximum of € 
24,250 for pension plan contributors aged over 65. Meanwhile, the relative limit on 
 
1 See Scholes et al.(2002). Antolín, de Serrres, and de la Maisonneuve (2004) and Yoo and de Serres (2004) 
examine the tax treatment of private pensions in the OECD countries. 
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5
deductions was removed in 2002, and the maximum allowable contribution has since been 
100 percent of taxable income excluding capital gains. 
Based on this regulatory framework, let us initially assume an initial capital IC 
available for investment in a pension plan. The contribution made produces tax savings. 
Given that the unit deduction will differ depending on whether it is applied to taxable 
income or tax liability, which shall denote each alternative by dq, where q takes the value 1 
or 2, respectively, for deductions from taxable income or tax liability. If the contribution is 
deductible from taxable income, d1 = tpx, where tpx is the marginal rate subject to the age x
at which the taxpayer made the contribution. If it is deductible from tax liability, then d2 =
0,15.
Hence, the net initial capital, NIC, will be equal to:  
)1( qdICNIC = [1] 
 
2.2. Accumulation 
The returns generated by pension plans are not taxable during the accumulation 
period. In the first place, the pension plan holder does not pay any Income Tax on the 
returns generated, which are not imputed to him. Meanwhile, the pension fund itself, 
though subject to Corporate Income Tax, benefits from a zero tax rate. Thus, the fund is 
required to file a corporate income tax return, but only to recover amounts withheld at 
source. Finally, Net Wealth Tax is not levied on the investment, because the vested rights 
in the plan were not initially subject to the tax, and they are currently exempt. 
Hence, the net rate of interest on the pension plan investment is: 
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itii sN == )1( [2] 
where i is the nominal gross rate, and ts the corporate tax rate. 
If x is the age of the individual making contributions to the pension plan, and j is 
her age upon retirement, the final capital accumulated will thus be: 
xjxj
N iICiICFC  +=+= )1()1( [3] 
 
2.3. Benefits 
Pension benefits could be withdrawn in the form of lump-sums or in the form of 
annuities. We will refer here only to the first case. When benefits are paid, the total amount 
is included in taxable income by way of earnings from labour. The way in which the tax 
base is established and the applicable tax rate calculated has changed over time.  
As shown in Table 2, the benefits received from the plan are eligible for an 
allowance. This was initially 2 percent of the returns obtained and is currently 40 percent. 
Between 1987 and 1998, the annualised returns (i.e. the quotient of taxable returns 
and the number of years in which they were generated) were taxed at the marginal tax rate. 
The remainder returns were taxed at the average rate, because it would not be equitable to 
apply a progressive tax schedule to returns generated over a number of years. So, the tax 
rate applicable to benefits is the weighted average of the average and marginal tax rates at 
the time the funds are withdrawn. Since 1999, the taxable part of pension plan benefits 
have been taxed at the relevant marginal tax rate. 
Let us call the tax rate applicable to benefits te, and the taxable part of the final 
capital obtained g. The tax liability will now be: 
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FCgtT eP = [4] 
And the net final capital will be: 
 )1()1()1( gtiICgtFCTFCNFC exjeP +===  [5] 
The formula for IRR is: 
 11
1)1(1
11


	



+=
	

=
 xj
q
exj
d
tgiNIC
NFCIRR  [6] 
 The IRR of pension plans has grown continuously since 1987 thanks to the tax 
regime, which is more favourable than for any other savings instrument. As shown in 
Figure 1, these assets have gradually increased their share of the portfolios held by 
individuals to somewhat more than 6 percent at present.2
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
2.4. Income, age and pension plan investment  
Let us now focus on the variables influencing the decision to invest in a personal 
pension plan. Based on the expression of IRR, we can predict the relationship between 
pension plan investment and the investor’s income. Since the year considered in the 
present empirical study is 1995, we shall work with the IRR expression for the period 1992-
1998, which is: 
 
2 Figure 1 was constructed on the basis of the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy, prepared by the Bank of 
Spain. Exhaustive information concerning pension plans in Spain is available in Dirección General de Seguros y 
Fondos de Pensiones (2004) and at the website of INVERCO, Asociación de Instituciones de Inversión Colectiva y Fondos 
de Pensiones: www.inverco.es. Blake (2004) investigates the allocation of UK personal sector wealth across five 
asset categories (net financial wealth, housing wealth, state pension wealth, private pension wealth, and 
human capital) using the financial AIDS model. He finds that, apart from total wealth and returns, other 
variables relating to capital market imperfections, and demographic, labour market and cross-sector spillover 
effects turn out to be significant. 
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In order to obtain the relationship between IRR and income levels, we first need to 
establish the relationship between the marginal tax rate at the time the contribution is 
made, tpx, and the tax rate levied on the benefits, te. As explained above, the latter is the 
weighted average of the average and marginal tax rates at the time the benefit is paid. We 
may therefore make the general assumption that it will be related to the initial marginal tax 
rate in the following manner: 
pxe tkt = , 10 << k [7] 
Thus, the pension plan participant’s income at the time the benefit is received, and 
hence the applicable tax rate, will be a given proportion of the income she received and the 
applicable tax rate applied while she was active. We may now calculate how IRR will vary 
when tpx changes: 
 ( ) ( ) 01111)( 1 2
11
>

	





	




+=
 
px
xj
px
e
px t
kg
t
tg
xj
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t
IRR  [8]  
Accordingly, the IRR of pension plans rises in line with contributors’ incomes and 
the applicable tax rates. We may therefore expect to find a positive relationship between 
income and pension plan contributions. 
Let us look now at the incentive to invest in pension plans and age. The IRR of 
pension savings is of no use to us here, because investments of differing duration cannot 
be compared on this basis. Consequently, we shall calculate the net present value of the 
investment in the plan, assuming that the alternative investment is tax exempt. 
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Based on the net initial and final capital respectively given in [1] and [5], the net 
present value of a one euro investment in a pension plan would be: 
)1()1()1(
)1()1(
kgttgttgt
i
NFCtNPV
pxepxepx
xjpx
==+=
=++=  [9] 
 Hence, anybody investing in a personal pension plan obtains a subsidy per unit 
invested, which is the same at any age. This subsidy represents compensation for the 
absence of liquidity inherent in pension plans. However, if we take into account that the 
loss of liquidity diminish as people grow older and the recovery of the investment draws 
nearer, we may conclude that the incentive to invest in pension plans is greater for older 
people.  
 
3. Empirical evidence for personal pension plan investment decisions 
 In this section, we seek to answer the two questions forming the objective of this 
paper. What variables influence the decision to invest in a personal pension plan? And, 
what variables affect the amount individuals decide to contribute to their pension plans? 
To answer these questions, we shall specify and estimate a Tobit model for a 1995 sample 
(the latest available) from the Institute of Fiscal Studies Personal Income Taxpayers Panel. 
The sample is formed by 3,041 tax returns, of which 358 include contributions to personal 
pension plans.  
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Following Cabrer, Sancho, and Serrano (2001), the specification of the model is as 
follow3. The regressand Yi can take a value of zero or the value of the variable *iY , known 
as the latent variable: 
( )
( )
 +=>
=
iiiii
iii
uXYXY
YXY
0,/
00,/
*
*
[10] 
In the first stage a Probit model is used to determine the probability that the 
variable *iY will take a value of zero rather than a positive value. In the second stage, a real 
and positive value is assigned to the variable Yi after a positive value has been 
probabilistically given to *iY , and the following model is specified with the subset of 
observations having a regressand other than zero: 
 iii uXY += * [11] 
where  are the coefficients, Xi the regressors, and ui is the error term, which is a random 
variable distributed based on normal N(0,2). 
In our model, the dependent variable is the amount of contributions made to 
pension plans. The explanatory variables are those usually considered in the literature4, to 
which have added some others that are specific to the reality of Spain. The variables used 
and the expected sign for each are shown in Table 3. Table 4, meanwhile, reflects the 
percentage of personal pension plan contributors for each variable, as well as the average 
contributions made. As the first row of this table shows, 11.77 percent of 1995 tax returns 
 
3 See also, Wooldridge (2003). 
4 See, for example, Guariglia and Markose (2000), Joulfaian and Richardson (2001), and Engelhardt and 
Madrian (2004) We have not been able to use the number of children, because this variable was not reliable  
in the sample. 
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declare contributions to personal pension plans, the average amount of which was 150,564 
pesetas.5
The regressors considered were as follows: 
 Age. Based on the argument derived from expression [9], we may expect to find a 
positive relationship between age and the contributions made to pension plans. This 
variable has been included quadratically as well. 
 Marital status. We have used a dummy variable with a value of zero for unmarried 
and one for married taxpayers. We opted to assign a positive sign to this variable, because 
we believe that prudential behaviour is more likely in the case of married people. 
Income level. Based on expression [8], we may expect a positive relationship 
between individuals’ income levels (i.e. taxable income prior to tax allowance for 
contributions) and the amount of the contributions made to pension plans. For the same 
reason, we may assign a positive value to the variable marginal tax rate. In addition, 
higher earners will also have greater capacity for savings. The income variable has also been 
included quadratically. 
Occupation. We have used dummy variables for the categories entrepreneurs, 
professionals and salaried employees. We consider that the first two categories are likely to 
make higher contributions than employees because their mandatory social security 
contributions are smaller. Also, we would expect professionals to make higher 
contributions because they are, in general, better educated and are likely to be more aware 
of  the advantages of this saving instrument . 
 
5 Following the Spanish Tax Agency -Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria- 9 percent of 1995 tax returns 
declared contributions to some kind of pension plan, the average amount of which was 184,150 pesetas. 
According to data from the Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones, 1,423,542 people contributed to 
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Year-end tax bill. The aim of this variable is to verify the hypothesis that people 
invests in pension plans with a view to reducing their year-end tax bill (i.e. the part of 
income tax not paid through withholdings at source), which is due upon the presentation 
of the income tax return. Thus, the higher the tax bill, the higher will be the pension plan 
contributions made. 
Membership of occupational pension plans. Our hypothesis is that membership 
of occupational pension schemes will encourage the participation on personal plans. We 
have employed a dummy variable with a value of one for taxpayers who are members of 
occupational schemes and zero for those who are not. In the case of the former, however, 
we expect the contributions made to fall as the employer’s contribution rises6. This 
variable has been assigned a negative sign. 
Prior year’s contribution. We believe that the behaviour of people contributing to 
pension plans may be to some extent routine, with the result that they will continue to 
contribute a roughly similar amount each year after setting up the plan. Consequently, we 
have assigned a positive sign to this variable. 
Mortgage repayments. A person who is still repaying the mortgage on his home 
will have less spare cash to contribute to his pension plan. The higher these mortgage 
repayments are, the less the person will contribute to the plan. 
Life insurance contributions. Like pension plans, life insurance policies are 
prudential savings instruments, although they do not have the same characteristics. While 
pension plans receive a more favourable tax treatment, life insurance are more liquid. If 
 
personal pension plans in 1995, investing an average of 132,823 pesetas. In 2004, 7,224,792 people made 
contributions, investing an average of € 746,87 (124,000 pesetas).  
6 Quite a lot of papers examine the factors affecting the employer contributions to pension plans. For the 
UK, see Casey (1994); for the USA, see Kiker and Rhine (1990), and Bernstein (2002). 
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pension plans and life insurance are substitute assets, we may expect that higher life 
insurance contributions will be associated with smaller contributions to pension plans. On 
the other hand, if they act as complementary assets (as table 4 would seem to indicate), this 
relationship will be the reverse. In short, we are unable to assign a positive or negative sign 
to this variable. 
[TABLES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The relationship between investment in the home, pension plans and life insurance 
is clearly apparent in figures 2 and 3, which are constructed on the basis of the sample of 
tax returns used for the applied study of 1995. It may be observed in figure 2, that buying a 
house is the most important investment made by people in their lifetimes. However, 
mortgage repayments begin to fall after the age of 50. Contributions to pension plans and 
life insurance are considerably smaller, but increase as individuals age. Average pension 
plan contributions rise fastest among people aged over 60, while life insurance 
contributions fall after the age of 65. 
Figure 3, which takes income levels into account, reflects sustained growth in 
average mortgage repayments along the income scale. This effect is particularly pronounced 
in the two upper deciles. There is also a slight rise in investment in pension plans and life 
insurance until the last two deciles, where average contributions increase sharply, especially 
in the case of pension plans. 
[FIGURES 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Based on the above variables, we have specified three models which provide 
alternative explanations for the decision to invest in a personal pension plan. The first of 
these, which we shall call the “prudential model”, is based on the hypothesis that 
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individuals invest in pension plans basically to save against their retirement, perhaps as a 
supplement to other retirement funds obtained from sources such as the social security or 
life insurance. The explanatory variables in this model are age, marital status, occupation, 
membership of an occupational pension plan, employer’s contributions, prior 
contributions, mortgage repayments and contributions to life insurance. The specification 
of the model is as follows: 
),,,
,,,,,,,(1
INSURANCEMORTGAGEPRIORCEMPLOYERC
ALPOCCUPATIONSALARIEDALPROFESSIONURENTREPRENESTATUSAGECfPLAN = [12] 
 The second “tax planning model” refers to the hypothesis that the individual’s main 
motivation is to obtain the tax benefits available to investors in pension plans. The 
exogenous variables included in the model are income level, marginal tax rate, year-end tax 
bill, mortgage repayments and life insurance contributions. The specification is: 
),,,,,(2 INSURANCEMORTGAGETAXBILLMARGINALTINCOMECfPLAN = [13] 
 Finally, the “general model” includes all of the exogenous variables and is based on 
the hypothesis that investment in pension plans can be explained both by prudential and 
tax planning concerns. The specification of the model is as follows: 
),
,,,,,
,,,,,,,(3
INSURANCEIMORTGAGE
PRIORCEMPLOYERCALPOCCUPATIONTAXBILLMARGINALT
SALARIEDALPROFESSIONURENTREPRENEINCOMESTATUSAGECfPLAN =
[14]
 The heteroskedastically robust estimation of the models was performed using the 
Econometric Views (Eviews) application, version 3.1. Using the logarithm of the verisimilitude 
function and the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria as the selection criteria, we 
chose the general model as the most adequate. The results of the estimation are shown in 
Table 5. 
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The variables found to be significant took the expected signs. In the first place, 
the amount of contributions rises with age, although at a decreasing rate (AGE) until the 
age of 45, whereafter contributions begin to decline as individuals grow older. As shown in 
Table 4, the percentage of older people still making contributions falls sharply, although 
the average amount set aside rises. Secondly, salaried employees make smaller contributions 
than people in other occupations (SALARIED). Meanwhile, we have been able to confirm 
that membership of an occupational pension plan stimulates investment in personal plans 
(OCCUPATIONALP), and that people benefiting from higher sponsor’s contributions to 
such plans invest less in their personal plans than they would were the sponsor’s 
contribution smaller (EMPLOYERC). Furthermore, savings in a given year are positively 
affected by the prior year’s contributions (PRIORC).  
While the above variables refer to prudential reasons for setting up a personal 
pension plan, there is another significant variable which is related with tax planning. In fact, 
contributions grow with income, although once again at a decreasing rate (INCOME) up to 
a threshold of 10.6 million pesetas (approximately € 64,000) covering the earnings of 99 
percent of income taxpayers. Thereafter, the amount of contributions begins to decrease as 
income rises.  
The last variable found to be significant in the estimation of the model expressed 
in [14] is the amount of mortgage repayments (MORTGAGE). This variable also took the 
expected sign and fits both with prudential and tax planning arguments for pension plan 
investment. Based on Table 5, we may affirm that taxpayers set aside less by way of private 
pension plan contributions as the amount of mortgage repayments made during the year 
rises. 
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In light of these results, we may conclude that individuals decide to invest in 
personal pension plans on complex grounds combining the wish to benefit from tax 
savings and to ensure they will receive supplementary income upon retirement. These 
results are in line with those obtained by literature in other countries. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Tables A1 and A2 given in the Appendix respectively reflect the estimation of the 
prudential and tax planning models. In the former, age and the three variables related with 
investment in pension plans (membership of occupational pension plans, employer’s 
contributions and prior contributions) are significant and take the expected signs.  In the 
tax planning model, meanwhile, the significant variables are income, tax bill and mortgage 
repayments, which once again take the expected signs. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 In this paper, we have examined the variables affecting the decisions to invest in a 
personal pension plan and the amount of contributions. We have found a combination of 
prudential and tax planning reasons for these decisions. Age and occupation affect 
individuals, as do membership of occupational pension plans, and previous contributions 
to their own personal plans, as well as the cost of mortgage repayments and income levels. 
 Our empirical study uses 1995 data, seven years after the first regulation of pension 
plans. In that year, these instruments had come to represent 4.4 percent of assets held by 
private individuals. Eight years on, this share has risen to 6.2 percent, confirming the 
consolidation of these prudential savings vehicles. Consequently, it will be necessary to 
Page 71 of 83
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
repeat the estimations carried out in order to confirm whether, as we believe, the variables 
that explain investment in pension plans in 1995 remain significant in the present.*
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TABLE 1. Pension plan IRR, 1987-2004 
Period IRR g
1987-1991 IRRP.87 = 11
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0.6 
(if j-x>2) 
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TABLE 2. Tax treatment of pension plans
1987 – 1991 1992 - 1998 1999 - 2004
CONTRIBUTIONS
Personal Income Tax saving tpx or 15% tpx tpx
Up to 52 years > 52 years
-- Absolute Ptas. 500,000 – 750,000 Ptas. 750,000 -1,100,000
In 1999: Ptas. 1,100,000
In 2000-01: Ptas. 1,200,000
In 2002: Ptas. 1,200,000
Since 2003: € 8,000
----
2000-01:+ Ptas. 100,000 (age–52)
In 2002:+ Ptas. 200,000 (age–52)
Since 2003: + €1,250 (age-52)
Limits on
allowances and
tax credits
-- Relative 15% earned income 15%-20% earned income 100% general taxable income
(In 1999-01: 20%, 25%)
100% general taxable income
(In 1999-01: 20%, 25%, 40%)
ACCUMULATION
Corporate Income Tax Zero rate
Net Wealth Tax Not subject Exempt Exempt
BENEFITS
Personal Income Tax base Final capital Final capital Final capital
Taxable returns 98% 95% – 100% 60%
Applicable tax rate te te tpj
Source: Own work.
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TABLE 3. Variables and expected sign 
Variable Symbol Expected sign 
Contributions to pension plans 
Age 
Marital status 
Income level 
Business activity 
Professional activity  
Salaried employment  
Marginal tax rate 
Year-end tax bill 
Membership of occupational scheme 
Employer´s contribution  
Prior year’s contribution 
Mortgage repayments 
Life insurance contributions 
PLAN 
AGE 
STATUS 
INCOME 
ENTREPRENEUR 
PROFESSIONAL 
SALARIED 
MARGINALT 
TAXBILL 
OCCUPATIONALP 
EMPLOYERC 
PRIORC 
MORTGAGE 
LINSURANCE 
 
+
+
+
¿? 
+
-
+
+
+
-
+
-
¿? 
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TABLE 4. Personal pension plan membership and average contributions 
 
VARIABLE PERCENTAGE 
CONTRIBUTORS
AVERAGE 
CONTRIBUTION 
(pesetas) 
TOTAL 11.77  150,564 
AGE 
 
20-25 
25-30 
30-35 
35-40 
40-45 
45-50 
50-55 
55-60 
60-65 
 
3.33  
 4.03  
 9.52  
 11.82  
 15.99  
 20.23  
 16.03  
 9.05  
 6.60 
 
76,100  
 71,294  
 107,387  
 143,148  
 157,821  
 168,435  
 162,782  
 182,430  
 213,851 
MARITAL STATUS 
 
Unmarried 
Married 
 
10.30  
 13.12 
 
123,855  
 169,825 
INCOME LEVEL 
 
Decile     1 
Decile     2 
Decile     3 
Decile     4 
Decile     5 
Decile     6 
Decile     7 
Decile     8 
Decile     9 
Decil    10 
 
2.63  
 3.95  
 5.59  
 6.25  
 7.57  
 10.53  
 11.18  
 15.13  
 21.38  
 33.55 
 
50,323  
 82,919  
 81,680  
 88,752  
 94,569  
 116,845  
 92,666  
 106,532  
 152,520  
 250,495 
OCCUPATION 
 
Entrepreneur 
 Professional  
 Salaried employee  
 
11.52  
 21.30  
 11.74  
 
156,509  
 212,584  
 147,810  
MARGINAL TAX RATE 
 
0.0% 
 20.0% 
 22.0% 
 24.5% 
 27.0% 
 30.0% 
 32.0% 
 34.0% 
 36.0% 
 38.0% 
 40.0% 
 42.5% 
 45.0% 
 47.0% 
 49.0% 
 51.0% 
 53.5% 
 
3.65  
 4.51  
 6.24  
 8.73  
 12.23  
 17.54  
 19.77  
 23.30  
 30.00  
 22.22  
 35.48  
 46.15  
 27.78  
 41.67  
 37.50  
 9.09  
 52.38 
 
72,952  
 101,716  
 86,341  
 98,111  
 103,398  
 134,515  
 147,252  
 165,826  
 118,837  
 286,168  
 184,481  
 195,188  
 167,069  
 395,785  
 515,049  
 151,029  
 390,886 
TAX BILL 
 
Negative 
Positive 
 
18.04  
 11.05 
 
252,739  
 131,215 
PARTICIPATION IN 
OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION PLAN 
 
Yes 
No 
 
54.64 
 10.36 
 
101,415 
 159,105 
MORTGAGE 
REPAYMENTS 
 
Yes 
No 
 
15.12 
 10.50 
 
122,641 
 165,916 
LIFE INSURANCE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Yes 
No 
 
23.52 
 9.04 
 
190,944 
 126,118  
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TABLE 5. Results of the Tobit estimation for the general model 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -772944.2 -64292.13 108576.3 -7.118904 0.0000
AGE 22964.83 1910.17 4915.381 4.672035 0.0000
AGE*AGE  -259.8054 -21.68 54.84662 -4.736945 0.0000
INCOME 0.042513 0.003514 0.005972 7.118444 0.0000
INCOME*INCOME -1.98E-09 -1,64693E-10 4.19E-10 -4.732125 0.0000
SALARIED -38574.77 -43470.35 16299.70 -2.366595 0.0180
OCCUPATIONALP 172098.7 43790.72 29915.47 5.752832 0.0000
EMPLOYERC -0.483151 -0.040188 0.067742 -7.132190 0.0000
PRIORC 1.290833 0.107369 0.050385 25.61938 0.0000
MORTGAGE -0.025753 -0.002142 0.011719 -2.197532 0.0280
Error  Distribution
SCALE:C(11) 159924.4 4444.289 35.98424 0.0000
R-squared 0.534140 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.532602 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 50112.37 Akaike info criterion 3.479154
Sum squared resid 7.61E+12 Schwarz criterion 3.500930
Log likelihood -5279.054 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.486981
Avg. log likelihood -1.735960
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1. Results of the Tobit estimation for the prudential model 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -918664.1 108308.6 -8.481915 0.0000
AGE 31463.59 4931.230 6.380475 0.0000
AGE*AGE  -350.2904 54.97829 -6.371431 0.0000
OCCUPATIONALP 190266.5 32070.75 5.932709 0.0000
EMPLOYERC -0.475665 0.070643 -6.733330 0.0000
PRIORC 1.466353 0.044976 32.60324 0.0000
Error Distribution 
SCALE:C(7) 168214.5 3625.361 46.39937 0.0000
R-squared 0.502038 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.501053 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 51776.03 Akaike info criterion 3.499670
Sum squared resid 8.13E+12 Schwarz criterion 3.513527
Log likelihood -5314.248 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.504651
Avg. log likelihood -1.747533
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
TABLE A2. Results of the Tobit estimation for the tax planning model 
 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -574386.7 27999.27 -20.51434 0.0000
INCOME 0.111300 0.008877 12.53834 0.0000
INCOME*INCOME -4.10E-09 6.32E-10 -6.490179 0.0000
TAXBILL 0.045730 0.019646 2.327738 0.0199
MORTGAGE -0.071568 0.023655 -3.025521 0.0025
Error Distribution 
SCALE:C(6) 266798.1 11630.07 22.94038 0.0000
R-squared 0.208576 Mean dependent var 17725.07
Adjusted R-squared 0.207272 S.D. dependent var 73299.59
S.E. of regression 65262.49 Akaike info criterion 3.674403
Sum squared resid 1.29E+13 Schwarz criterion 3.686280
Log likelihood -5580.930 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.678672
Avg. log likelihood -1.835228
Left censored obs 2683 Right censored obs 0
Uncensored obs 358 Total obs 3041
Figure2. Ageand average investmentin assets.
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Figure 1. Distribution of family assets.1984-2003
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Figure 2. Age and average investment in different assets.
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Figure 3. Income levels and average investment in assets.
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